[NYTr] A Spooky Look at the CIA: Weiner's "Legacy of Ashes"
All the News That Doesn't Fit
nytr at blythe-systems.com
Fri Aug 17 18:48:09 EDT 2007
Christian Science Monitor - Aug 14, 2007
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0814/p13s01-bogn.html
A spooky look at the CIA
A history of US intelligence makes for uncomfortable reading.
By Randy Dotinga
The Guatemalan military bugged the bedroom of the US ambassador in 1994
and caught her cooing to someone who was not her husband but did share
her female secretary's name.
The CIA passed on this juicy tidbit to Washington DC, where it became
the buzz of the capital during a period of difficult relations with
Guatemala. And who did the recipient of these sweet-nothings turn out
to be? The ambassador's 2-year-old poodle.
It was yet another blunder in a long line of CIA debacles. This time,
however, no dictators were propped up, no wars were started, and no one
was assassinated. Presidents and Congress were not misled, and
predictions about world affairs were not utterly, completely, and
dangerously wrong.
In other words, the mistake was hardly newsworthy as these things go.
After all, the agency routinely destroys whatever it touches, according
to the aptly named Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA.
The agency's past is filled with "fleeting successes and long-lasting
failures abroad," writes author Tim Weiner, a national-security reporter
at The New York Times. "The agency's triumphs have saved some blood and
treasure. Its mistakes have squandered both."
Forget the latest James Patterson thriller. This is by far the scariest
book of the year. By Mr. Weiner's account, the agency created after
World War II to predict the next Pearl Harbor has spent six decades
mishandling virtually every major world crisis. It's also managed to
spy on American citizens while failing to anticipate everything from
the Bay of Pigs fiasco to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and
9/11.
Forecasting the future, of course, is a difficult business. But
predictions are most useful when they're based on information from good
sources and solid analysts, and the CIA rarely had either.
Throughout the entire cold war, a grand total of three spies provided
useful details about Soviet military efforts. Years later, the agency
relied on fewer than a handful of agents to give it the inside story
about Iraq's supposed weapons of mass destruction.
The roots of the CIA's debacles lie in its early days, writes Weiner.
Instead of chasing secrets, leaders preferred the dashing world of
covert operations.
Eliminate a left-leaning president here, support a right-wing
anticommunist leader there: It was all good. Bad men ended up in power
and thousands paid the ultimate price, from Chile and Vietnam to Cuba
and Indonesia.
The 20 CIA directors have included some dedicated and accomplished men,
such as Bob Gates, the current secretary of Defense, and two Christian
Scientists, Adm. Stansfield Turner and William Webster. But, as Weiner
puts it, most "have left the agency in worse shape than they found it."
There is plenty of blame to go around. Presidents and Congress both
failed to keep the CIA under control and never answered a crucial
question: How can a democracy and a secretive intelligence agency
coexist?
Since the book is so hard-hitting, some readers might assume Weiner is
another liberal reporter on an ideological rampage. But the agency's own
historians confirm many of his post-mortems.
Federal judge Laurence Silberman, a conservative's conservative who
investigated the CIA's role in the run-up to the Iraq war, said generals
would be sacked if the military had made such huge mistakes.
(The CIA itself, however, posted a response to "Legacy of Ashes" on its
website last week, saying that the book "overlooks, minimizes, or
distorts agency achievements." The agency's post says Weiner's account
of what it calls his "juiciest" story the tale of the US ambassador in
Guatemala is misleading. It also offers a catalogue of what it says are
some of the inaccuracies in the book and concludes saying, "Weiner's
bias overwhelms his scholarship. One cannot learn the true story of the
CIA from 'Legacy of Ashes. ")
While it's unceasingly grim and less colorful than it could be, "Legacy
of Ashes" is still readable, thanks in part to Weiner's ability to
convince a parade of major players to speak freely.
Former CIA director Admiral Turner, for example, describes a moment when
he had to decide what to do about an agent inside a terrorist
organization who was being asked to kill a government official in order
to prove his bona fides. Turner, to his credit, decided that the
possible benefits, including saved lives, were not worth making "the
United States party to a murder in order to take that chance."
The book is also strengthened by Weiner's sharp grasp of top-secret
internal CIA documents, including reports that were declassified as late
as this year.
Needed: a road map for the future
The only flaw in "Legacy of Ashes" is Weiner's failure to look forward.
While he says the country "lacks the intelligence it will need in the
years ahead," he doesn't provide a map for the future that will change
that.
It will be up to others to learn from the CIA's troubled history and
set a new course for intelligence gathering.
[Randy Dotinga is a freelance writer in San Diego.]
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