[NYTr] Not-News: Cia "missed chance" to thwart al Qaeda pre-9/11

Tue Aug 21 19:34:03 EDT 2007

In the "well, duh, this is news?" department...  It's fun to speculate
about who/what is promoting this stuff at this particular time. -NYTr]

AP via Yahoo - Aug 21, 2007
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070821/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/cia_sept11

CIA missed chances to thwart al-Qaida

By KATHERINE SHRADER
Associated Press Writer

The CIA's top leaders failed to use their available powers, never
developed a comprehensive plan to stop al-Qaida and missed crucial
opportunities to thwart two hijackers in the run-up to Sept. 11, the
agency's own watchdog concluded in a bruising report released Tuesday.

Completed in June 2005 and kept classified until now, the 19-page
executive summary finds extensive fault with the actions of senior CIA
leaders and others beneath them. "The agency and its officers did not
discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner," the CIA
inspector general found.

"They did not always work effectively and cooperatively," the report
stated.

Yet the review team led by Inspector General John Helgerson found
neither a "single point of failure nor a silver bullet" that would have
stopped the attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people.

In a statement, CIA Director Michael Hayden said the decision to
release the report was not his choice or preference, but that he was
making the report available as required by Congress in a law President
Bush signed earlier this month.

"I thought the release of this report would distract officers serving
their country on the front lines of a global conflict," Hayden said.
"It will, at a minimum, consume time and attention revisiting ground
that is already well plowed."

The report does cover terrain heavily examined by a congressional
inquiry and the Sept. 11 Commission. However, the CIA watchdog's report
goes further than previous reviews to examine the personal failings of
individuals within the agency who led the pre-9/11 efforts against
al-Qaida.

Helgerson's team found that no CIA employees violated the law or were
part of any misconduct. But it still called on then-CIA Director Porter
Goss to form accountability boards to look at the performance of
specific individuals to determine whether reprimands were called for.

The inquiry boards were recommended for officials including former CIA
Director George Tenet, who resigned in July 2004; his Deputy Director
for Operations Jim Pavitt; Counterterrorism Center Chief Cofer Black
and the agency's executive director, who was not further identified.
Other less senior officials were also tagged for accountability
reviews, but identifying information was removed from the report's
public version.

In a statement, Tenet said the inspector general is "flat wrong" about
the lack of plan.

"There was in fact a robust plan, marked by extraordinary effort and
dedication to fighting terrorism, dating back to long before 9/11," he
said. "Without such an effort, we would not have been able to give the
president a plan on Sept. 15, 2001, that led to the routing of the
Taliban, chasing al-Qaida from its Afghan sanctuary and combating
terrorists across 92 countries."

In October 2005, Goss rejected the recommendation for the inquiry
boards. He said he had spoken personally with the current employees
named in the report, and he trusted their abilities and dedication.
"This report unveiled no mysteries," Goss said.

Hayden stuck by Goss's decision.

Providing a glimpse of a series of shortfalls laid out in the longer,
still-classified report, the executive summary says:

• U.S. spy agencies, which were overseen by Tenet, lacked a
comprehensive strategic plan to counter Osama bin Laden prior to 9/11.
The inspector general concluded that Tenet "by virtue of his position,
bears ultimate responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan
was ever created."

• The CIA's analysis of al-Qaida before Sept. 2001 was lacking. No
comprehensive report focusing on bin Laden was written after 1993, and
no comprehensive report laying out the threats of 2001 was assembled.
"A number of important issues were covered insufficiently or not at
all," the report found.

• The CIA and the National Security Agency tussled over their
responsibilities in dealing with al-Qaida well into 2001. Only Tenet's
personal involvement could have led to a timely resolution, the report
concluded.

• The CIA station charged with monitoring bin Laden — code-named Alec
Station — was overworked, lacked operational experience, expertise and
training. The report recommended forming accountability boards for the
CIA Counterterror Center chiefs from 1998 to 2001, including Black.

• Although 50 to 60 people read at least one CIA cable about two of the
hijackers, the information wasn't shared with the proper offices and
agencies. "That so many individuals failed to act in this case reflects
a systemic breakdown.... Basically, there was no coherent, functioning
watch-listing program," the report said. The report again called for
further review of Black and his predecessor.

While blame is heaped on Tenet and his deputies, the report also says
that Tenet was forcefully engaged in counterterrorism efforts and
personally sounded the alarm before Congress, the military and
policymakers. In a now well-known 1998 memo, he declared, "We are at
war."

The trouble, the report said, was follow-up.

The inspector general did take exception to findings of Congress' joint
inquiry into 9/11. For instance, the congressional inquiry found that
the CIA was reluctant to seek authority to assassinate bin Laden.
Instead, the inspector general believed the problem was the agency's
limited covert-action capabilities.

The CIA's reliance on a group of sources with questionable reliability
"proved insufficient to mount a credible operation against bin Laden,"
the report said. "Efforts to develop other options had limited
potential prior to 9/11."