[NYTr] COHA Blasted for article on Haiti

Tue Oct 2 15:36:52 EDT 2007

[Last week the Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA) sent around an
announcement that they were opening a web discussion on a recent,
and apparently very controversial, Sep 14, 2007 article on Haiti
entitled "Préval of Haiti  A Provisional Report Card: Grade B+"
http://www.coha.org/2007/09/14/preval-of-haiti%e2%80%94a-provisional-report-card-grade-b/

We have not found any of that promised discussion, if it's posted yet,
except for a few comments in their forum which you can see here:
http://cohaforum.blogspot.com/2007/09/regarding-prval-of-haitia-provisional.html
and we had decided originally not to distribute their Sep 14th article.
However, since NarcoNews has seen fit to post a loud denunciation of
it, we will send it out following this critical article.  

Several weeks ago COHA also sent out an announcement about major new
coverage they planned of the Manuel Noriega extradition request by
France, and the maneuvering over it in the US and Panama (do they or
don't they want Noriega back, etc.?)  That hasn't appeared either.
Perhaps it's just the disorganization of a new academic year, or
growing pains, but COHA -- which in the past excelled in their
scholarship, care and accuracy, has been rather uneven lately.

See the Sep 21, 2007 Narconews article at the URL below for extensive
embedded links. -NY Transfer]

NarcoNews - Sep 21, 2007
http://www.narconews.com/Issue46/article2784.html

The Council on Hemispheric Affairs Deserves an F for Article on Haiti

Conflicting Reports from the Research Organization Raise Questions
about Its Reporting in Haiti

By Joe Emersberger
Special to The Narco News Bulletin

COHA, The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, recently published a piece by
one of its research associates, Michael Glenwick, entitled “Préval of
Haiti — A Provisional Report Card: Grade B+.” In it, Glenwick recycles
the smears that contributed to Haitian President Aristide’s ouster in
2004 and, subsequently, to the worst human rights disaster in the
Western Hemisphere. There can be no serious dispute about the scale of
the bloodbath under Gerard Latortue’s coup installed government — one
that was backed (quite predictably) by the US, Canada, France and the
UN Security Council. Less predictable, and in some ways more important,
was the backing Lortortue received from progressive and “independent”
institutions. Glenwick’s article moves COHA decisively into the camp of
NGOs and media outlets that have served Haiti’s neo-Duvalierists so
effectively in recent years. This represents a significant loss.
Shortly before and after the coup, COHA stood admirably apart from the
corporate media herd in its analysis of events in Haiti.

The opening paragraph of Glenwick’s article says that Latortue’s
“accomplishments were meager at best” and that those years were
“unstable” and “wasted.” In the next paragraph Glenwick says that
“hundreds — if not thousands — of opposition party members were
murdered” under Latortue. One is left wondering how many Haitians would
have to die before Glenwick would condemn Latortue rather than offer
modest praise and mild rebukes. In contrast, COHA’s Jeesica Leigh wrote
a piece in 2004, co-authored by COHA director Larry Birns, about
Latortue’s government entitled “A brutal regime shows its true colors.”

Citing no evidence, Glenwick equates Aristide to Latortue by writing
that Aristide’s time in office was an “equally rocky period” but then
goes on to assess Aristide much more harshly than Latortue by writing
“Perhaps due to the attempted coup in late 2001 — or, just as likely,
his own insensitivity to inclusive rule — Aristide seemed to manifest a
show of lassitude to the rule of law as well as indifference to
democratic institution building. He encouraged citizens to use violence
when needed to fight the nation’s armed opposition, and civil liberties
and political/human rights were in short supply.”

People who care to look for evidence to evaluate Aristide’s human
rights record, especially compared to Latortue, Cedras, Duvalier, would
come to quite a different conclusion.

A scientific survey by Athena Kolbe and Royce Hudson found that at
least 4000 political murders were perpetrated during Latortue’s time in
office – overwhelmingly by government security forces and their
proxies. In contrast, after scouring Amnesty International reports,
Perter Hallward, a UK based researcher, wrote “Amnesty International’s
reports covering the years 2000-03 attribute a total of around 20 to 30
killings to the police and supporters of the FL [Aristide’s party] — a
far cry from the 5,000 committed by the junta and its supporters in
1991-94, let alone the 50,000 usually attributed to the Duvalier
dictatorships.”

Pierre Esperance, one of Aristide’s most vehement, and dishonest,
critics claimed in a (successful) funding request to the Canadian
government that 100 people had been killed (not all Aristide opponents)
during the “last several months” before the coup which he described as
the worst period under Aristide.*

These numbers do not only reveal that Aristide’s track record was
vastly superior to his opponents, they also show why it was inevitable
that some of his partisans would conclude that violence was justified.
Even during most of his second term Aristide’s supporters were more
likely to be killed than his opponents’ supporters.[6] Glenwick
completely disregards the massive amount of violence Haiti’s poor have
been subjected to, and the threats they continually faced, to join the
chorus of pious Western intellectuals who condemn Aristide for having
said that the poor have the right to defend themselves. Many of those
intellectuals also argue that the U.S. has the right to bomb
defenseless countries thousands of miles away in “self defense.” The
hypocrisy is as breathtaking as it is unnoticed by countless writers
who have condemned Aristide for “incendiary” speeches.

Astonishingly, Glenwick refers to the presidential election that Preval
won as “Haiti’s fairest election in decades.” In reality, as COHA
accurately reported at the time, the election was a “caricature of the
real thing.” Preval won, not because the election was fair, but because
his opponents were so despised that they couldn’t win an election they
had rigged.

Prominent Aristide allies such as the Rev. Gerard Jean-Juste, So Ann,
and Yvon Neptune were in jail on trumped up charges. Thousands of other
Aristide supporters were also in prison, exiled or in hiding. Aristide
strongholds were subjected to state sanctioned terrorism by the Haitian
National Police (fully supported by UN troops). Again, much of this was
documented by COHA (for example, in a piece entitled “Haiti – And you
call this an election?” among other articles.)

Another barrier placed in the way of participation by Haiti’s poor was
the number of polling stations. About ten times more stations were
available when Aristide was elected in 2000. COHA reported “many
Haitians will have to walk more than two hours just to reach a voting
center.” Haitians endured huge lineups and travel time in order to
vote. When it was clear Preval was headed for victory in the first
round a last ditch attempt at fraud was attempted. A truckload of
ballots marked for Preval was found in the trash. Huge, non-violent
demonstrations pressured Latortue’s regime to honor the results.

Glenwick noted that Preval was “a close friend and political comrade of
Aristide” but did not explain the significance of Preval’s victory.
Preval was untarnished by participation in the coup or association with
Aristide’s opponents. Haiti’s ambassador to the US, in a letter to the
New York Times, used Preval’s candidacy to imply that Aristide’s
Lavalas movement was not being persecuted.[10] Preval received the
endorsement of the Rev. Gerard Jean-Juste, who was not allowed to
register from prison as a candidate in the election. If Glenwick’s
characterization of Aristide’s government had been accurate then Preval
would never had stood a chance in a fair election, never mind one
designed to disenfranchise most of the people who would vote for him.

The Herculean efforts required to elect Preval were not replicated
during the legislative elections. The turnout was much lower than in
the presidential election. Unpopular parties heavily backed by foreign
democratization agencies obtained disproportionate power, but Glewnwick
approvingly refers to this outcome as a necessary check on Preval.
Glenwick’s fear is that, like Aristide, Preval might demonstrate
“insensitivity to inclusive rule” (i.e. be reluctant to capitulate to
politicians unable to win in fair elections).

Much of the material required to refute Glecnwick is on COHA’s website.
Did Glenwick read any of it? Did COHA’s editors? Should we expect a
retraction of the articles COHA published in the past that refute
Glenwick? Without engaging in Orwellian “doublethink” COHA must choose
to either stand behind Glenwick’s analysis or their past work on Haiti.
I hope people contact COHA director Larry Birns (larry.birns at gmail.com)
and respectfully ask him which COHA articles he stands behind.

*Documents obtained under Freedom of Information act by Anthony Fenton,
a Canadian independent journalist