[NYTr] COHA Reconsiders Its Ill-Considered Report on Haiti

[All the News That Doesn't Fit]

Prior relevant items:

COHA Blasted for article on Haiti (9/21/07)
http://blythe-systems.com/pipermail/nytr/Week-of-Mon-20071001/069430.html

COHA: Preval of Haiti - Provisional Report Card: Grade B+ (9/14/07)
http://blythe-systems.com/pipermail/nytr/Week-of-Mon-20071001/069431.html


Council on Hemispheric Affairs - Oct 16, 2007
http://www.coha.org/2007/10/16/prval-goes-it-alone-but-what-about-aristide/


Haiti: Revisiting the Aristide debate - To Our Readers

There has been an intense dispute on the part of outside critics
regarding COHA's piece on Haiti - which was issued on September 14,
2007. Its author, Michael Glenwick stands behind his article and the
sharp criticism of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, which has
now been moved from COHA's website and can be found in COHA's Forum.

After closely reviewing the Glenwick piece, COHA's senior officials
regretfully concluded that much of the criticism of it - notably the
September 21, 2007 critique of COHA's Haiti piece by Joe Emersberger
for the Narco News Bulletin - was well-founded. It should also be noted
that most of the contributions we received on the subject were opposed
to our point of view; this is why we decided to submit the Glenwick
article to a protracted review. Today we are replacing the Glenwick
piece with a substantially revised version which was authored by COHA
Director Larry Birns. This is now COHA's official position on the
relative roles of Presidents Aristide and Préval and contains some
glimpses of the former president's strengths and weaknesses, including
his invaluable contribution to Haitian democracy.

Ever since he came into prominence in 1989, COHA has devoted much of
its effort to spotlighting the life and times of President Aristide,
stressing Washington's persistently radical and hostile rightwing
attitude towards him under both the Clinton and Bush Administrations.
>From 2002-2004, COHA issued scores of analytical pieces on U.S.-Haitian
relations written by Larry Birns, often in conjunction with COHA
Research Fellow Jessica Leight. This included a co-authored
contribution to Dr. Paul Farmer's "The Uses of Haiti" written in 2003:
Mr. Emersberger was good enough to take note and praise this long
association.

Please feel free to to read Glenwick's original article, and
Emersberger's hard-hitting analysis of Glenwick's piece.

[COHA has moved the Glenwick piece to the COHA Forum, at
http://cohaforum.blogspot.com/2007/10/prval-of-haitia-provisional-report-card.html
but both it and the Emersberger article critical of it, as published,
are listed above at NY Transfer; these links work and are a bit less
confusing. -NY Transfer]

                              ***

Préval Goes it Alone, But What About Aristide?

by COHA Director Larry Birns

* Foreign resources scheduled to flood Haiti

* Préval cooperates with opposition which essentially has gotten
what it wanted

* Will Préval be able to maintain his integrity under pressure from
Washington, or will the Bush administration insist that he implements a
neutered platform?


More than 18 months have passed since René Préval was decisively
elected president of Haiti in what many regional analysts considered
one of the country's most crucial elections. Within scarcely a handful
of years, Haitians had experienced a number of tumultuous events. It
started with President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's chaotic second term, in
which the international community cancelled its aid to the country
based on a pretext elaborated by Washington, involving exaggerated
accusations of election fraud on Aristide's part involving his party's
2000 victory in legislative and presidential ballots. Shortly
thereafter, the 2004 de facto coup d'état designed to oust Aristide and
his government led to two wasted years under the appalling U.S.-imposed
rule of Interim-Prime Minister Gérard Latortue and President Boniface
Alexandre, whose pathetic accomplishments were meager at best. In
short, after Latortue's essentially lawless stint, Haiti was in
desperate need of an effective and democratically elected leader who
would carry on the work of a bushwhacked Aristide presidency which has
been undermined by a malevolent U.S. strategy aimed at undermining the
country's constitutional leader rather than providing his
administration with the resources and collaboration it needed to
survive. The hope was that Préval would govern fairly and help inch the
poverty-stricken state out of its traditional rutted despair. When
Préval began his second tenure as president in February 2006, he was
expected to bring about change.

The Préval Presidency Begins

After the 2006 election, international observers almost unanimously
validated Préval as president and that the elections were entirely free
and fair. It was hoped that the unblemished manner in which Préval
won—through an outside monitored democratic process that upheld the
Haitian constitution—would establish a mindset for his rule. Whether
that democratic process would be the hallmark of Préval's time in
office or just an early and later excisable irrelevancy will have to be
known before evaluating the effectiveness of his presidency. Now, more
than a year and a half following what could have been Haiti's fairest
election ever, it is time to take a look at what has transpired on the
island in the intervening period.

Was democracy as practiced by Préval to be just a calling card for
international respectability, or was it intended to serve as a constant
thread of what would be President Préval's entire time in office? And
then there was the legacy of the Aristide Presidency. While there was
little dispute over the fact that the last year of Aristide rule was
defined by spreading corruption and ineffectuality, was this not the
predictable result of the cordon sanitaire thrown around by a
Washington who saw the man as a Caribbean pariah, a would-be Fidel
Castro, and a permanent irritant to productive ties between
Port-au-Prince and Washington. The question is, could anyone provide
effective rule under such conditions (a corrupt treasury, no security
force loyal to him, and a cut-off of almost all outside funds)? After
the State Department successfully manipulated Aristide into fleeing the
island, the wasteland under the supine Alexandre and the villainous
Latortue ensued when scores of Aristide sympathizers were murdered.
Only a true, stable democracy, it was believed, would be able to revive
growth and development on the island. By this point, only Préval could
do the job.

Past and Present

While Aristide was still president, his critics accused him of running
the country without energy, devotion to the constitution, or a tireless
commitment to building democratic institutions. His defenders, on the
other hand, said his active accomplishments surpassed those of everyone
else who had tried in decades. Perhaps due to the several attempts to
force him out of office, together with his own insensitivity to
inclusive rule, Aristide, in the end, seemed to manifest a lack of
vigilance when it came to the rule of law as well as only qualified
fidelity to democratic political engagement. While in the past this
could have been true, he is likely to explain that he tolerated the use
of citizen violence when it was needed to fight the nation's now armed
opposition (probably equipped and guided by U.S. intelligence
services), if only because the police were not loyal to him and he had
no other reliable force at his disposal. During this period, civil
liberties and political/human rights were in short supply. For all
intents and purposes, there was a constitution in name only, something
which newly elected President Préval—whom, it should be noted, has been
a close friend and political comrade of Aristide—has promised to change.

At the time of Préval's inauguration, the dismal situation on the
ground did not look that much different than it did in 2001. But within
a few months, some significant steps were being taken in order to
implement a series of necessary changes geared toward getting closer to
the ideal of creating a democratic, law-abiding society and a
fair-minded and effective administration which was responsive to its
citizens. The most important step taken by Préval during this period
was the first one—the implementation of free and open balloting, whose
results no one contested. As much as that might be minimized due to
Préval's overwhelming popularity—he won with 51% of the vote, while
runner-up Leslie Manigat obtained only 12%—it was an important
signature event that put Haiti back on track to a functioning
democratic course. Most importantly for average Haitians, this meant
the restoration of much of the international aid that had been
vindictively and unjustifiably cut off during Aristide's time in
office. All told, Préval's government was earmarked to receive $750
million in assistance from donor nations, indicating a major vote of
confidence by the international community for his government.

Baby Steps Toward Democracy

With Préval's decisive election victory, many analysts expected his
Lespwa (Front of Hope) Party to also carry the day in the two
legislative bodies, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Lespwa's
opponents shocked Préval and his backers, as the party was able to take
only 13 out of 30 Senate seats and to elect no more than 23 out of 99
representatives in the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, Préval was thrown a
curveball at the outset of his administration. Whereas the margin of
his personal victory in the presidential race normally might have been
enough to give him a mandate to rule as a strong leader, the
disappointing results of the parliamentary vote were a stark reminder
that, even if he wanted to introduce dramatic progressive reforms, he
would have to face major obstacles and likely would have to reach ad
hoc compromises with the parliamentary opposition on major legislation.
In addition, while Préval has gone some length to shape the legislature
to cooperate with his agenda, he has been unable to automatically
generate a working majority on a day-to-day basis.

Préval Augments His Authority One Step at a Time

As a result of this early check on Préval's power, few major pieces of
legislation on Préval's wish list have managed to make it through the
legislature. In addition, since no other party held more seats than
Lespwa, coalition building was, during much of the post-election
period, an exceedingly slow and laborious process, as in each instance,
Lespwa's elected members tried, with little success, to establish a
predictable working majority coalition. To a large extent, this was
just another important sign that, although legislative accomplishments
might be slow in coming due to the lack of a working majority, the
process would, at least, carry with it no surprises.

In 2000, Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas party had "won" 26 of 27 senate seats
and 73 of 83 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, leading to both
skepticism and frustration on the part of his opposition both inside
and outside the country. In fact, the integrity of most aspects of that
election was beyond dispute and only a handful of senate elections were
actively challenged (and of these, Aristide eventually voided all of
them). On the other hand, in 2006 and early 2007, Haitian political
figures and international observers alike expressed their confidence
that Préval, after he was elected, would be sure to govern
democratically because that is what he was all about. While political
developments and the policies that he wanted to push through the
National Assembly have been slow in falling into place, the respect
that he has attracted and his acknowledgement of the constitutional
guarantees, which he freely offered to honor and the pledges that those
around him knew would be his guide were attributes that he has
possessed for decades.

Préval's Style of Government

A closer look at how the National Assembly has functioned could help
shed some light on the status of democracy in the country. Its first
task—and, in many ways its most important one—was to approve Préval's
cabinet choices. Due to the nature of the competing political factions,
this became a somewhat complex process. In the end, however, a cabinet
that included members of six political parties was approved in a near
unanimous vote; this was considered by both Préval's supporters and his
opponents as akin to a vote of confidence in him. This process could
protect Haiti from the one-sided rule that had dominated the country
for so long, and, almost as important, it demonstrated Préval's
instinct to strive for consensus and to govern in a democratic habit.

Soon after the cabinet was formed, the Assembly began taking a few of
the necessary baby steps to effect political changes of its own. Many
of the elected officials in both the Senate and Chamber of Deputies
have begun to craft legislation that would help curb corruption in the
courts. Although the National Assembly has been far from entirely
successful in this mission, it is still trying to push legislation
through in a parliamentary manner, which has to be considered an
encouraging improvement. This is something for which, in a recent visit
to Port-au-Prince, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon was
moved to praise the National Assembly, as he encouraged lawmakers to
adopt legislation reinforcing—if not establishing for the first
time—the systematic and predictable rule of law in the country. In
previous years, the combination of corrupt, hands off or hands on
strongman presidents and the powerful influence of neighborhood gangs
and associations of self-favoring elites, has made doing so all but
impossible. However, as the UN secretary general's confidence in the
National Assembly suggests, Haiti has a unique opportunity to change
course, an opportunity that cannot be squandered, a fact which is
recognized by both Préval and some of the more responsible opposition
members of the legislative branch. When, in 2008, one-third of the
Senate seats will be contested, the continued strengthening of the
legislative process likely will be at the forefront of many of the
candidates' platforms.

Potholes Remain on the Road to Democracy

Although the current state of president-assembly relations might
suggest that all is well with democracy in Haiti, there are still a
significant number of problems that remain, suggesting that the
island's political process has traveled only a few blocks on the long
road to a functioning democracy. With the welcomed lack of a standing
military force and the endemic rotten stain affecting the Haitian
National Police, Haitians who oppose the government or voice thoroughly
validated opinions denouncing the police force, often find that the law
isn't always there to protect them.

Even when the law does come into play, its inefficiencies and lack of
reliability usually don't allow it to do much for the public good. The
court system is weak, outdated, and, just like the tainted police and
other fouled Haitian institutions, corrupt. Prisons themselves are old
and unspeakably bleak, as is the criminal justice system. Prisoners
live in overcrowded jails with only scraps of food; according to an
Amnesty International report, more than 2000 prisoners (some of them
high profile) are being held in Haitian jails without ever having been
charged. At least 100 of those detained are said to be political
prisoners. Furthermore, because as of now there is a lack of resources
to properly train personnel and provide decent conditions for the
inmates, a significant turn of events would be necessary to allow for a
truly professional judicial and penal system to emerge with any
assurance that justice will be served.

The old-fashioned, poorly managed, and chronically corrupt judicial
system is not the only aspect of Haitian society that must gain the
attention and concern of Préval and his legislative confederates if
they are to ensure the establishment of a long-lasting, genuinely
democratic state. Labor conditions in Haiti continue to reflect a
disdain for human rights and democratic principles. For example,
Haitian authorities have done little to change the old colonial
tradition of restavec, in which young Haitian children are sent away
from their parents to work, for all intents and purposes, as domestic
slaves for wealthier families in often far-off communities.

Although one can very well make the case that cultural traditions and
values should be upheld whenever they can, such archaic practices, like
the restavec, do little to boost Haiti's quest for a caring society.
Meanwhile, along Haiti's border with the Dominican Republic, little has
been done to reinforce border security, with the illegal trafficking of
Haitian laborers continuing to be a chronic problem with which the
Port-au-Prince government invariably has ineffectively dealt. To date,
Haiti authorities have done little to implement border reforms with the
neighboring Dominican Republic. This may prove to be a significant
challenge to Préval in the next few years, given the troubled history
that the Haitians have had with the Dominicans, as well as the array of
problems and tensions that the Haitian refugee issue has brought upon
their neighbors, including fighting for access to the limited resources
that can be found there.

In recent years, Haiti's gangs have posed serious problems for the
country's political leadership, and Préval, too, will not be escapable
to this problem. However, instead of choosing to let them dominate
various street corners of Port-au-Prince and elsewhere in Haiti, Préval
recently decided that he would take the matter into his own hands,
something that Aristide (who often chose to negotiate with the gang
leaders) seldom did.

Due to the lack of an efficient police force, Préval has had to rely on
the current contingent of 7,500 UN troops stationed in Haiti to do his
bidding. Although this has brought about some successes, the impaired
state of the country's judicial system means that many of the gangsters
who have been arrested might not ever face timely justice. This series
of recent actions concerning gang outrages raises a number of important
questions that are likely to be resolved only after significant time
and a good deal of effort has been invested on a presidential level.
Certainly, negotiating with the heads of often brutal and power-hungry
political and common-crime motivated gangs, often involved in the drug
trade, has not advanced a society hoping to be orderly and more
representative of the Haitian populace. This was exemplified by the
mainly ineffective results flowing from Aristides's dealings with the
Cite Solei gangs. However, with corruption abounding in the courts and
with the gang leaders' pockets running deep, along with the jails
already overflowing with detainees who haven't even faced formal
charges, let alone a trial, Préval does not have a wide range of
choices available for him to make.

A Long Road Ahead

Faced with the aforementioned gang problems, the acceleration of
drug-related issues, and the ongoing practice of media self-censorship
as an act of prudence, Préval and the National Assembly have much work
to do in shaping how the first elected government following Aristide's
arrested ouster will ultimately be perceived by the public. However, if
recent events give any indication, there are some grounds for hope.
Certainly, Port-au-Prince has quite a bit on its plate, but passing
legislation that might lead to an improvement next year of the
country's last-place finish in Transparency International's Corruption
Perceptions Index might not be a bad place to start. But at least the
Préval government is doing things democratically. In both the executive
and legislative branches, the signs are there: there is a growing
respect for the law and the democratic process that were first spelled
out in the country's nearly 20-year-old constitution, but never fully
honored until now. Democracy is not a concept that should be toyed
with, and we should not expect Haiti to turn into a shining model of it
overnight. What we can expect, however, is that the country's
modernization and humanization will continue and that Préval and the
Assembly will be respectful as they try to repair the nation and its
basic institutions, as well as honor Aristide for his undeniable
contribution towards helping build a good society, as Haiti moves on to
better days.