[NYTr] Iraqi Kurdistan, or Kurdish Iraq?

[All the News That Doesn't Fit]

sent by Paul Wolf (activ-l)

[His own essay and a very interesting series of articles. - NYTr]


Iraqi Kurdistan, or Kurdish Iraq?

by Paul Wolf
Oct 22, 2007

Semantics do count.  Another front in the battle of ideas, in the battle
for men's minds, in the intersection of politics and war.  This is
not the time for the Kurds to fight for their long dreamed-of homeland.
I'm sorry but I just can't support Kurdistan now.

This is not the time to redraw maps of the middle east and central
asia.  George Bush recently said that if Iran were to develop a nuclear
weapon, it would mean "World War III."  Thank God he'll be out of
office long before that could occur.  But one has to wonder what the
implications to world peace will be as these disasterous wars continue
to spiral out of control. The recent assassination attempt on Benazir
Bhutto, with the help of the ISI protecting her, and the prospect of
fighting between Turkish and US forces in "Iraqi Kurdistan" should come
as a wake up call to the overconfident warmongers of Washington.

Of course, all peoples have the right of self-determination. And the
history of the that part of the world makes it clear that colonial
powers misdrew national borders based on contemporary politics rather,
than enduring factors such as ethnicity and language. Afghanistan is one
example. Few if any Washington pundits would know that the central plaza
in Kabul is called Pashtunistan Square, a monument to the idea of a
Pashtun state that includes a large part of Pakistan. Anyone wondering
why the Afghan conflict is spilling into Pakistan need look no further
than the language, culture and history of Afghanistan.

The other half of Afghanistan speaks Farsi.  Thankfully, Iran has
managed to stay out of the Afghan war. Iran has a great influence inside
Afghanistan, and gets little credit for the stabilizing role it plays in
the conflict between the US and Afghan nationalists. (aka Taliban) Iran
could cause serious problems there, but it doesn't.

This all must seem quite incomprehensible to the typical American
newspaper reader. Our citizens are generally uninformed about the
dynamics that shape world events.  You may note that I rarely, if ever,
use US news media as sources.  They're not up to par.  We're in a
semi-permanent state of cognitive dissonance. That's a psychologist's
term for what happens to his patient when his world view collapses
because it's based on erroneous underlying principles.  One's world can
come crashing down like a house of cards.

When this happens to the collective mindset of a nation, when that
mindset has been shaped by politicians and news media selling a
particular version of reality to a target audience, the results can be
dramatic. Who knows what could happen.  Maybe we'll enter into another
era like the 1960's.  I can't help but believe there will be a social
reaction when we finally realize, collectively, what we have done. We
can't put the Genie back in the bottle, and we can't blame George Bush
for letting him out.  We're all responsible.

Again, I don't want to sound like a conspiracy theorist, or a person
overly concerned about black helicopters, but bad things are happening,
and this is the time to get the anti-war machine into gear.  When I
find myself agreeing with Michael Rubin, I experience my own version of
cognitive dissonance.  This can't be happening, but it is. As
frustrating as it is, our country desperately needs our voice, and it's
time to lead our leaders out of this mess.

- Paul

                            ***

http://blogcentral.jpost.com/index.php?cat_id=4&blog_id=48&blog_post_id=1606

The Persian Abyss: The breaking point of Turkish angst

Posted by Reza Zarabi, The Jerusalem Post, Oct 21, 2007

When the Turkish Parliament, in March of 2003, decisively rejected
Americas request to station troops in their country, a host of pundits,
tyro think-tank analysts, and like-minded lap-top warriors from the
usual Bush apologist circus in the GOP lambasted the secular Muslim
country for caving in to Islamic extremism and not understanding the
global threat that Saddam apparently turned out not to be. Well, for
what it's worth, those who actually have stepped foot into the Middle
East within the last decade and understand the complex dynamics of Iraq
and the broader region realize that those who called for a new American
adventure were basing their policies on optimistic delirium and either
ignored or were oblivious to the cataclysm that most surely followed.

The Turks, however, knew better.

Was the Turkish refusal really a betrayal to decades of American support
for their country and economy? Was it some kind jejune, pacifist
capitulation to Islamic extremism? Was it, in any way, a stab in
[Americas] back as military analyst, Ralph Peters suggests? The answer
is quite banal.

Knowing the history of their southern neighbor, the cultural nuances of
the region, and having experienced a 20-year armed conflict against able
Kurdish terrorists seeking to carve out a quarter of their country, the
Turks were fully aware that a broken Iraq would be pernicious to Turkish
security long after the Americans have left.

Beholden to Friends

The Turkish Republic, like any other country, was merely attempting to
protect the territorial integrity of its nation and the safety of its
citizenry. In the run-up to the Iraq invasion, the Turkish government
made unremitting requests to the Bush administration about its concerns
regarding Kurdish autonomy and how the establishment of a terrorist safe
haven for the PKK, Komala, PJAK and other rogue elements claiming to
represent the Kurdish people could bring the region on the verve of
implosion. The Bush administration at the time was at the pinnacle of
its neo-con hubris, fully believing that its Strauss-ridden prophecies
would come to fruition. As a result, the Turks were promptly ignored
and set aside. (It is evident now that it was at this same period that
the US government decided to reject Irans offer of helping to stabilize
Iraq and Afghanistan, to support a two-state solution in Israel and
Palestine, and subsequently end the financial support for all militant
groups, including Hamas and Hizbullah, in exchange for the United
States ending their quest for regime change in Teheran and the halt of
funding terrorist groups like the PKK and Jundallah that murder
innocent Iranian civilians.)

In a recent, detailed assessment of Bushs inconsistent foreign policy
endeavors, AEI scholar, Michael Rubin pointed out how American failures
in dealing with the side-effects of its prescription for Middle Eastern
ailments has alienated traditional US allies all the while undermining
American credibility. The most startling was his assessment of Turkey:

Too often, the administration has sacrificed long-term credibility for
short-term calm. Take Turkey. At the June 2004 NATO summit in Istanbul,
President Bush promised Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that
the US military would shut down Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorists
in Iraq. He did not. Three years later, the Turks no longer trust US
promises and may send their army into Iraqi Kurdistan. Already the
damage to US prestige is severe. Once among America's closest allies,
Turkey, according to a Pew Global Attitudes Project poll [in June
2007], is the most anti-American country in the world. Only 9% of Turks
have a favorable impression of the US; 83% hold the opposite view.
Increasingly, friends view Washington as an unreliable ally[1]

Rubins characterization of American actions in order to obtain
short-term calm is easily applicable to US policy towards the broader
region. In the showdown with Iran, the Bush administration along with
British intelligence has been covertly funding PJAK, an Iranian
subsidiary of the PKK, in its conflict against the Islamic Republic
government. As in Turkey, these terrorist organizations do not
represent those who they claim to be their constituency. Just like the
PKK, terrorist groups such as Komala and PJAK kill both Kurds and
non-Kurds alike in their attempts to achieve their twisted political
aims.

The Ambiguity of Terror

What makes this situation so ironic is that the US government is now
overtly funding a terrorist organization, a subdivision of the PKK, and
all the while requesting assistance for Iraqi stabilization from the
very same government that the PKK is currently at war with, namely
Turkey. It is in this paradox where we see how Bushs misconceptions
about the region and the subsequent failings of his Middle Eastern
strategy not only vitiate Americas image but is also now threatening
traditional allies, who in times past, acquiesced to American
objectives and, most importantly, adding to the region's instability.
Americas Middle Eastern policy has become a source of the problems
instead of some idealized panacea that those in the West wish to it to
be. Bushs unwillingness to confront the Kurdish regional government, as
they give tacit support to the PKK whom have made northern Iraq their
base of operations, and his unintelligible policies in funding
terrorists of convenience, while he alleges to wage a war on terrorism,
is directly causing the deaths of Turkish citizens. The supply of
weapons that the US provides to PJAK to cause instability within Iran
along with the Kurdish Regional Governments protection for the PKK has
created a de-facto arms Wal-Mart within the north of Iraq. At a time
when American military officials accuse Iran of providing weapons to
Shi'ite death squads in southern Iraq to kill Coalition soldiers, the
US is directly arming rogue Kurdish elements within Iraq, which they
subsequently use in their conflict against the Turkish Republic and
other regional countries like Syria and Iran.

None of this augurs well for regional stability.

Dr. Sedat Laciner of the Turkish think-tank ISRO summed up his
governments rancor towards American duplicity by stating that if the US
ignores or supports the PKK in the region, the US fight against global
terrorism will lose its baseif you support my terrorists, I can not help
you in fighting against your terrorists. Not only is the US ignoring the
PKK, but also it has foolishly adopted the policy of arming and training
PKK sycophants in their stealth war against Iran.

Broken Alliance

No responsible government would outsource its territorial sovereignty
and the safety of its population for the kindness of friends, no matter
how much of a global power that ally may be. Yet, the Turkish government
clearly finds itself in such a precarious position. In describing
Turkeys frustration, Michael Rubin mentioned that Turkey may possibly
invade northern Iraq as a result of the burgeoning threat it has
become. This would not only add a new and inimical element to the Iraq
War but has the potential of aligning the governments of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Syria with Turkey, a US ally, to combat terrorists
that operate with the tacit support of another US ally, namely the
Kurdish Regional Government. Within the last year, both the Turkish and
Iranian governments had pledged support for each other in fighting
Kurdish rebels, therefore, this scenario is by no means unlikely.

Next week, the Turkish parliament is scheduled to vote on the
possibility of a Kurdish campaign. This has obviously concerned
Washington officials, for if this were to happen, it not only would
devastate the only stable region of the now fractured Iraq, it may very
well pit the US against Turkey for the first time.

These are the by-products of a foreign policy that was based on
idealized versions of war, propagated by neophytes that used philosophy
as the only method to support their assertions, and ultimately carried
out by the imperial hubris that neglected all the concerns of the
parties involved, save its own.

What American foreign policy has effectively done is fully convince its
strongest Muslim ally in the world that the War on terror only applies
to America and America alone and that if some psychopath from northern
Iraq that is being financed through US-associated third party channels
strikes down an innocent Turkish citizen, it is of no great consequence.

Within the past week, prominent Turkish columnists such as Cem Oguz,
Yusuf Kanli, and Mehmet Kalyoncu have openly chided the oblivious and
apathetic approach that the US has shown towards the dire concerns of a
fellow NATO ally, and in some instances, saliently expressed a desire
for change in Turkish foreign policy. Although I believe it is a
tangential matter, the US Houses vote on the recognition of the
Armenian genocide has only exacerbated an already tenuous relationship,
coming to a head this past Friday, when Turkey recalled its US
ambassador back home.

If indeed, Turkey does invade its southern neighbor, there can be no
justifiable condemnation against it or any accusations suggesting over
reaction or an abuse of force. Turkey has seen this crisis dramatically
escalate with constant appeals to the US government falling on deaf
ears. Within this past year, Turkey has seen dozens of its citizens and
soldiers brutally massacred at the hands of terrorists that emanate
from the sovereignty of a US ally. It is becoming clear now that
allegiance with Washington, according to several Middle Eastern
nations, could be more of a liability than an asset.

Some lessons are only learned from the scars that remain, and just like
the Shah of Iran, the Afghan resistance against the Soviets, the Shia of
Iraq, and the Kurds under Saddam, the Turks are being newly introduced
into Americas school of hard knocks, where, clearly the lecture is you
are liked as long as you are useful.

Maybe unchallenged compliance to every American-proposed escapade is not
in the best interest of the countries that actually inhabit the region.

                           ***

http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=125144&bolum=8

Israel likely to lose Turkey if Armenian resolution passes

Today's Zaman, Oct 22, 2007

Expert on Turkish foreign policy B|lent Aras said Israel might be
further isolated in the Middle East if abandoned by Turkey following a
possible passage of the Armenian genocide resolution in the US Congress.

Turkey has been a trump card for Israel against Syria and Iran, but
Turkey hasnt been on Israels side on that. Still, Israel doesnt have a
problem with being isolated. The Israeli state builds walls around
itself, said Aras, who currently teaches at I~}k University in ]stanbul.

With Turkish Parliament granting permission last week to the government
to send the military into northern Iraq to crush the outlawed Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK), the Turkish foreign policy debate has grown heated,
and foreign policy questions like Turkeys response to PKK terrorism and
its relation to the Armenian genocide resolution have come to the table
again.

The situation in northern Iraq has already been an area of friction, and
a new crisis such as the genocide resolution hasnt been helpful. Turkish
people dont believe that the United States supports Turkey in Iraq, plus
the United States confronts Turkey regarding the Armenian resolution,
Aras said.

For Monday Talk, he explained how these different areas of concern,
although not linked at first glance, are actually interconnected.

Should we expect an incursion into northern Iraq any time soon?

The authorization of Parliament means that the government is politically
ready for an incursion and the legal ground has been established.
However, there is still need for the operation decision by the
political leadership and preparations on the military side. When
considering an operation, there are other factors such as weather
conditions, the readiness and the number of troops, etc., [to take into
consideration]. There are also different types of cross-border
operations. It may involve only air strikes or ground forces or both.
Depending on how its going to be conducted, it will lead to different
results. In addition, there is a picture of Turkey as a threatening
country and the opposite view at the same time.

What kind of contradictions do you mean?

When you look at Turkey from Iraq, you see two different images. One is
Turkey getting ready for an incursion, ready to confront with Iraqi
forces or even American forces in the region. The other is the Turkey
that is providing 70 percent of the logistical support for American
troops in Iraq, supporting the building up of Iraq in regards to the
many construction projects going on, and a Turkey in relationships with
many different ethnic groups in Iraq, trying to help their inclusion in
the political system. For example, a Sunni leader, Tareq al-Hashemi, has
become Iraqi vice president with the help of Turkey. He has been
integrated into the system even though he had a potential to become a
powerful resistance figure. Turkey also helped a lot in the writing of
the new Iraqi constitution in 2005. Turkey also brought together the
neighboring countries to prevent any destabilizing factors.

Which image of Turkey do you think is going to prevail?

Maybe well see that in the next period, especially after the
authorization of Parliament for an incursion.

How would the passage of the Armenian genocide resolution in the US
Congress play into all that?

We see that Turkish foreign and domestic policies have been interacting
greatly in recent years. Foreign policy issues have been discussed as
domestic policy matters. And foreign policy has been hostage to domestic
policy matters. There has been almost no distinction between foreign and
domestic policy. And Turkey shows a weakness of relating some domestic
policy issues to foreign policy matters, like we relate the Kirkuk
problem to the PKK problem, and northern Iraq with the Armenian
resolution problem in the US. This attitude weakens Turkeys arguments
in the foreign policy arena.

So do you think Turkey is overemphasizing the problems related to the
Armenian genocide resolution in the US?

Its the first time that such a resolution has approached being passed.
Thats an important factor for Turkey that gives the issue more emphasis.
Another factor is the present tension in US-Turkish relations. I think
the basis of Turkish-American relations, which had been a strategic
partnership since the years of the Cold War, has to be changed according
to the new challenges in the region and the world. In this process of
establishing a new base, well have some ups and downs in relations. The
situation in northern Iraq has already been an area of friction, and a
new crisis, such as the genocide resolution, hasnt been helpful. Turkish
people dont believe that the United States supports Turkey in Iraq, plus
the United States is confronting Turkey with regards the Armenian
resolution.

Is Turkeys reaction to be expected then?

Its to be expected but the reaction has been doubled since other
problems in relations wait to be resolved.

Do you expect the resolution to pass?

Although there are some setbacks in the House, there is still a high
probability that it may pass.

Did the US-based Anti-Defamation League (ADL) support for the resolution
help it?

Two diaspora have collaborated.

Is the ADLs support related to the policies of Israel?

There is a perception of such in Turkey, but I dont agree with it.
Israels official policy is not to support the passage of the resolution.
Plus the Jewish diaspora can act independently of Israel.

In that specific case, do you think the Jewish diaspora has been acting
independently of Israel?

The perception is that Turkey has been punished by the resolution
because of its policies regarding Israel. I dont have facts to support
relations between the ADLs actions and Israels policies in that case,
but we have to evaluate them separately. There are different types of
Jewish diaspora in the US including the ones supporting Turkey.

But the ADL is an important one.

The ADL did not support Turkey in that case.

Right or wrong, since there is a perception by the Turks that Israel
might be behind the ADLs support for the resolution, how do you think
Turkish-Israeli relations would be influenced if the resolution passes
in the US Congress?

In the 1990s, when Turkish-Israel relations were being fostered, the
idea behind their relations was that the Jewish lobby would support
Turkey in the US. Plus the Jewish lobbys help was seen as important in
arming the Turkish military. Apparently, the lobby doesnt side with
Turkey on the resolution issue, which is a most emotional one for
Turkey. So the reason behind their relations has been disappearing. The
relations have been questioned already.

Do you expect a breaking up?

The level of the relations has still been balanced. Turkey has been in a
position to constructively criticize Israels policies. And a lot of
Turkeys criticisms of Israel have been heard there. At the end the two
countries neither break up nor come closer.

Could Israel be further isolated in the region?

Israel has already been isolated in the region. Israel forms tactical,
diplomatic relations in the region not based on peace. Its been trying
to develop relations with non-Arab Muslim states to break its isolation.
Turkey has been a trump card for Israel against Syria and Iran, but
Turkey hasnt been on Israels side on that. Still, Israel doesnt have a
problem with being isolated. The Israeli state builds walls around
itself.

And Turkey has been following a zero problems with neighbors policy.
Would it be able to follow that policy with an incursion into northern
Iraq?

The idea behind the no problems with neighbors policy is to have a
European-like approach toward countries around Turkey so you can
continue with the democratic reform process and concentrate on
increasing standards of living. If your agenda is dominated by security
concerns and ethnic nationalism, you cannot deal with concerns related
to democracy. If youve watched the discussions in Parliament during the
meeting for the authorization of an incursion into northern Iraq, youd
have seen that parliamentarians have become either doves or hawks, and
the debate had nothing to do with the countrys problems. Plus, the
Turkish military presence in the Middle East has always been
problematic.

You mean the Middle Eastern states dont like to see Turkish troops in
their territory?

Even Turkeys peace corps in Lebanon hasnt been well received by some
Lebanese groups. Since the Middle Eastern region was dominated by the
Ottoman Empire, there is a historical reason they dont want to see the
Turkish military in the region. Now Turkey has a respected civilian and
economic presence in the region. You can see Turkish products all
around. You can shop using Turkish lira in Syria, Egypt and even in
northern Iraq. Turkeys image has been further strengthened in the
Middle East when Turkey did not authorize the transit of the US troops
into Iraq on March 1, 2003.

Do you think the PKK might be trying to drag the Turkish military into
the region?

The image of Turkey that the PKK wants to portray is a Turkey that is
aggressive and willing to use military power at the first opportunity.
The PKK doesnt like Turkeys economic and civilian presence in the
region.

Does Turkey rightly perceive a threat if an independent Kurdish state is
formed in northern Iraq?

Iraqs territorial integrity is important for Turkey and other countries
that have an interest in the region. Iraqs disintegration is neither
good for Turkey, nor the other Middle Eastern countries, the US or the
European Union. The EU does not want a threatening state close to its
borders. Iraqs disintegration would automatically threaten the American
soldiers in the country. Syria, Iran and Turkey wouldnt like rising
pan-Kurdish nationalism. Iraqs reconciliation process should be
supported by all. Still, Turkey cannot ignore that there is an ongoing
process in northern Iraq, which is the building up of a Kurdish nation.

How in that case can Massoud Barzani (the head of the regional Kurdish
authority) support Turkey against the PKK?

Nobody, especially Barzani, would want to be in a position to mistreat
the people in that region. In the short run, Barzani wouldnt take
Turkeys side against the PKK, at least not by his own will.
Additionally, Kurds want to have an independent state even though the
present situation doesnt allow it. So Barzani would like to act as the
leader of emerging Kurdish nation. He considers the PKK to be part of
the Kurdish nation and would not want to be in the position of
punishing his relatives in this sensitive process. However, Barzani is
important to any effort that targets the PKK. There is an urgent need
for a two-track policy and there should be a win-win situation for the
both sides. First Ankara needs to increase its leverage in Iraqi
politics in a way that central administration can limit the Kurdish
groups not vice versa. Second, Ankara should engage with Barzani in a
constructive manner, which would help him to understand the meaning of
a responsible politician in this sensitive region. Both carrot and
stick may work here.

Would talking to Iraqi President Jalal Talabani help?

In that regard Abdullah G|ls presidency is a positive development
because he would probably have a meeting with Talabani. Communication
channels should be open to other secular groups in Iraq including Sunni
groups other than already engaged and Shia groups, in particular
secular ones like Iyad Allawi, etc.
[Asia Times Online article already distributed not included here:
"Bhutto bombing kicks off war on US plan"
http://blythe-systems.com/pipermail/nytr/Week-of-Mon-20071022/070534.html

                           ***

http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IJ11Df01.html

 From Washington to war in Waziristan

By Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times Online, Oct 11, 2007

A dramatic sequence of events in Pakistan has grabbed global attention,
but few have so far connected the dots between the hurried issuance of a
National Reconciliation Ordinance on October 5 and the savage fighting
that is currently raging in the North Waziristan tribal area.

The National Reconciliation Ordinance, issued by President-elect General
Pervez Musharraf, grants immunity to current and former lawmakers who
have been accused of corruption. It paves the way for a political
settlement between Musharraf and former prime minister Benazir Bhutto,
which is expected to result in a civilian-based consensus government
after parliamentary elections in about three months' time.

The ordinance was issued just 24 hours before Musharrafs reelection as
president, yet only three days prior to the Musharraf-Bhutto deal, which
is what the ordinance amounts to, Musharrafs representatives had
declined to accept Bhuttos conditions.

And within 12 hours of Musharraf's reelection, he was commanding what
has become the most bloody military operation against al-Qaeda and
Taliban in North Waziristan.

On October 1, Bhutto announced in disillusionment that talks on a
political settlement with Musharraf were completely stalled. Islamabad
had categorically rejected Bhuttos demand for tangible confirmation of a
guarantee that if she supported Musharrafs bid for the presidency and
the formation of a new government after parliamentary elections, she
would be absolved of all corruption charges pending against her in
national and international courts. A verbal assurance that the cases
would be withdrawn was not enough for the twice elected former premier,
whose previous governments were both removed on charges of corruption.

News of the breakdown in the dialogue reached Washington - the chief
broker of a Bhutto-Musharraf settlement - in a very short time. Indeed,
Pakistans political transition is the most important link in US strategy
in the southwest Asian region and to some extent in the Middle East. The
US State Department's Richard Boucher has visited Pakistan and United
Arab Emirates (where Bhutto has been living) six times in the past nine
months in an attempt to reconcile Musharraf and Bhutto and thus ensure
a friendly government in Islamabad, thus retaining an ally in the "war
on terror" as well as curbing any adventurous designs by the Pakistani
military and safeguarding Pakistans nuclear assets.

While last week's political machinations were under way in Pakistan, the
US was providing intelligence to Islamabad about a massive regrouping of
the Taliban in the Pakistani tribal areas in preparation for a big
campaign against NATO forces in southeast Afghanistan. The US feared
that a disruption of the political dialogue would mean a hiatus in
Pakistans political transition, and delay military operations against
the thousands of Taliban and al-Qaeda forces gathering in North
Waziristan before launching attacks on the Afghan provinces of Khost,
Paktia, Paktika, Gardez and Ghazni, and then Kabul with unending waves
of suicide missions. If the Taliban were allowed to hatch their plans
unmolested during a political vacuum in Islamabad, Washington believed
the Taliban would seize the upper hand in Afghanistan.

That was the situation when a representative of the US spoke to Bhutto
and noted her minimum demand for a political deal: At least a signed
letter by General Pervez Musharraf which would document his promises
against my demands. US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice then spoke
to Musharraf by telephone, and immediately thereafter, Musharrafs legal
team promulgated the National Reconciliation Ordinance.

In Pakistan, certain circles are immune from ordinary legal recourse.
Corruption in the military, for example, can only be probed and punished
by the military. Under the new reconciliation ordinance, politicians and
parliamentarians can now only be questioned by parliamentary committees
and not through ordinary laws, and all past corruption cases against
those who have held political positions in the past have been
withdrawn. Some analysts have criticized the ordinance as permitting
the rise of the rule of political mafias in Pakistan.

As soon as ordinance was issued, Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party
separated itself from other opposition parties and did not resign from
the assemblies. However, the party remained firm on its "principled
stand" that it would abstain in Musharraf's reelection vote. Musharraf
swept the election as there was virtually nobody to oppose him.

Within a day of Musharraf's victory, Pakistani F-16 aircraft were flying
sorties from Kohat Airbase to bomb the North Waziristan town of Mir Ali,
acting on intelligence and satellite maps provided by US intelligence.
Top al-Qaeda ideologues, reportedly including the group's number two,
Ayman al-Zawahiri, were believed to based in the town.

The fighting in the area is continuing for a fourth day, in what has
become the biggest battle in the tribal areas since 2003. So far, over
600 casualties have been reported, the majority of them civilians.
Several dozen militants have been killed. The Paksitani armed forces
have reported 45 military casualties, but a jirga (assembly of elders)
handed over 73 bodies of Pakistani soldiers to the commander of the 7th
division of the Pakistan Army on Monday. Another jirga handed over 50
wounded soldiers to army commanders. The aerial bombardment continues,
causing a mass migration of the local population to nearby cities.

The flames of Waziristan fires always reach Islamabad and Karachi. When
Benazir Bhuttos aircraft lands in Karachi on October 18, the battle of
Waziristan will be reverberating there. The top commander of the
Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, has already openly vowed to kill
her, and a strong Taliban cell in Karachi is ready to perform the task.